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Don’t be a hero. Don’t have an ego

What does it mean to be a hero in trading?

In poker, a “hero call” is sometimes appropriate. It refers to the call of a very large river bet with medium strength — or even Ace-high — based on a strong read that your opponent whiffed on a draw and is representing a huge hand to steal the pot.

In markets and trading, there is no official definition, but we can more or less surmise being a “hero” looks like the following:

Putting your foot down and saying “markets will do X, I’m sure of it!”

Pointing to the sky like Babe Ruth — “this is where my profits on this trade are going to go!” (more…)

Real Times News Will Not Increase Your Bankroll

Another explanation as to why real time news is useless:

Mike Bloomberg became the richest man in New York by selling traders just fifteen seconds head start on the data they needed. Fifteen seconds costs thousands of dollars a month per trader. But in most cases, what we get online is not actually in real-time and it’s not news, either.

Getting ever closer to the first moment is expensive in other ways. It might cost you in boredom, because watching an entire event just to see the good parts takes time, particularly if there’s no guarantee that there will even be good parts.

It might cost you in filtering, because the less you’re willing to wait, the more likely it is that you’ll see news that’s incorrect, out of context or not nearly as valuable as it appears.

When journalists, analysts and pundits are all racing to bring you the ‘news’ first, you get less actual news and more reflexive noise. Go watch an hour of cable news from a year ago… what were they yelling about that we actually care about today? (more…)

Federer’s Loss is Our Gain

Always something to learn when Federer is clearly beaten which can be applied to markets, especially in a market like today:
1. He was out of position, or better put, poorly positioned for all of the match.
2. Up early in the opening of the match, he failed to hold and close his early lead when he had clear opportunities.
3. He made errors in pivot points early in the second and third sets – giving away every chance to get back into the match.
4. He was a consummate professional in defeat in the post match – the opponent was better, played better, and deserved to win.
The pundits will like to call this another sign of his decline, etc. I’m not so sure. Particular in that his inability to hoist another championship trophy is now nearly fully priced in.

More Research Confirms The Benefits Of Overconfidence

over-confidenceOverconfidence may cause people to invest too much in volatile stocks because such stocks have a greater diversity of beliefs, and so if people dismiss the objectively bad odds of beating the market, such people will be drawn to stocks where they are in the extremum, and highly volatile stocks have the most biased extremums.  One might think these people are irrational, but in the big picture people with this bias actually have a huge advantage, why Danny Kahneman said it’s the bias he most wants his children to have.
Two economists at Washington State University looked at twitter accounts for sports prognosticators and found that confidence was much more important than accuracy in generating followers. Their sad conclusion: Pundits have a false sense of confidence because that’s what the public, seeking to avoid the stress of uncertainty, craves. In other words, to be popular (read: successful), you need to be unwarrantedly confident. This takes either an amoral cognitive dissonance or ignorance. (more…)

The Probabilities Win Every Time

Columnist David Brooks wrote an interesting article in the New York Times on how to effectively use probabilities:

In 2006, Philip E. Tetlock published a landmark book called “Expert Political Judgment.” While his findings obviously don’t apply to me, Tetlock demonstrated that pundits and experts are terrible at making predictions.

But Tetlock is also interested in how people can get better at making forecasts. His subsequent work helped prompt people at one of the government’s most creative agencies, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, to hold a forecasting tournament to see if competition could spur better predictions.

In the fall of 2011, the agency asked a series of short-term questions about foreign affairs, such as whether certain countries will leave the euro, whether North Korea will re-enter arms talks, or whether Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev would switch jobs. They hired a consulting firm to run an experimental control group against which the competitors could be benchmarked. (more…)

MANAGING RISK

Well, perhaps the best way is to emulate some of the trading principles used by the pundits of yesteryear who beat the stock market no matter the emotions and mechanics of the institutional herd. For instance:

Bernard Baruch – Some 70 years ago, he would research a stock, buy it, and then each time the stock rose 10% from his purchase price, buy an additional amount equal to his first purchase. If the stock began declining he would sell everything he had bought when the drop equaled 10% of its top price …

Baron Rothschild – His success formula was centered on the famous quote attributed to him – “I never buy at the bottom and I always sell too soon.” …

Jesse Livermore – This legendary speculator profited enormously by calling the various 1921 – 1927 advances correctly. In 1929 he reasoned that the market was overvalued, but finally gave up and became bullish near the top in the fall of that infamous year.

He quickly cut his losses, however, and switched to the “short side.” Livermore listed three major points for his success:

1. Sensitivity to mob psychology

2. Willingness to take a loss

3. Liquidity, meaning that stock positions should not be taken that cannot be sold in 15 minutes “At the market” …

Addison Cammack – A stockbroker from Kentucky who swore by the two-point stop-loss rule. “If you’re wrong,” he said, “you might as well be wrong by two points as ten.” He followed this method successfully and was one of the few bears to make a fortune on Wall Street and keep it …

Interestingly, all of these disciplines have one thing in common. They all adhere to Benjamin Graham’s mantra, “The essence of portfolio management is the management of RISKS, not the management of RETURNS. Well-managed portfolios start with this precept.”

Marty Zweig, Ned Davis, and Humility

MUST READIt is perhaps poignant that with many people looking for a market correction and much talk of elevated sentiment measures bringing back memories of 1987, that we learned today of the death of Marty Zweig, widely known not only for the put-call ratio, and ‘Don’t fight the Fed’, but also his prescient call in October 1987 just before the crash.

Marty Zweig calls the Crash of ’87 (The whole thing is worth watching but Marty comes in around the 6:40 mark)

Watching that piece of history again there’s much that modern business networks could learn from it. Notice the easy-going style of Louis Rukeyser, the complete lack of confrontation with his panelists, no raised voices, no sound effects, no gotchas. This is after one of the most wretched weeks in Wall St, (worse was to come obviously), but you would barely know it from the calm civility which permeates their discussion.

What I particularly like and admire however, is in making his observations Marty Zweig is almost apologetic about it. He fears we’re on the verge of something severe but rather than take the opportunity for grandstanding as many of today’s pundits would, he’s almost scared to tell everyone. He says: (more…)

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